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Comparison of single-winner voting systems
Criterion Method	Majority	Majority loser	Mutual majority	Condorcet winner^{[Tn 1]}	Condorcet loser	Smith^{[Tn 1]}	Smith-IIA^{[Tn 1]}	IIA/LIIA^{[Tn 1]}	Cloneproof	Monotone	Participation	Later-no-harm^{[Tn 1]}	Later-no-help^{[Tn 1]}	No favorite betrayal^{[Tn 1]}	Ballot type
Anti-plurality	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Single mark
Approval	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes^{[Tn 2]}	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Approvals
Baldwin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Ranking
Black	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Ranking
Borda	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Ranking
Bucklin	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Ranking
Coombs	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Ranking
Copeland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Ranking
Dodgson	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Ranking
Highest median	Yes	Yes^{[Tn 3]}	No^{[Tn 4]}	No	No	No	No	Yes^{[Tn 2]}	Yes	Yes	No^{[Tn 5]}	No	Yes	Yes	Scores
Instant-runoff	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Ranking
Kemeny–Young	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	LIIA Only	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Ranking
Minimax	Yes	No	No	Yes^{[Tn 6]}	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No^{[Tn 6]}	No	No	Ranking
Nanson	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Ranking
Plurality	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Single mark
Random ballot^{[Tn 7]}	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Single mark
Ranked pairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	LIIA Only	Yes	Yes	No^{[Tn 5]}	No	No	No	Ranking
Runoff	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Single mark
Schulze	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No^{[Tn 5]}	No	No	No	Ranking
Score	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes^{[Tn 2]}	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Scores
Sortition^{[Tn 8]}	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	None
STAR	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Scores
Tideman alternative	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Ranking
Table Notes	^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g Condorcet's criterion is incompatible with the consistency, participation, later-no-harm, later-no-help, and sincere favorite criteria. ^ ^a ^b ^c Approval voting, score voting, and majority judgment satisfy IIA if it is assumed that voters rate candidates independently using their own absolute scale. For this to hold, in some elections, some voters must use less than their full voting power despite having meaningful preferences among viable candidates. ^ Majority Judgment may elect a candidate uniquely least-preferred by over half of voters, but it never elects the candidate uniquely bottom-rated by over half of voters. ^ Majority Judgment fails the mutual majority criterion, but satisfies the criterion if the majority ranks the mutually favored set above a given absolute grade and all others below that grade. ^ ^a ^b ^c In Highest median, Ranked Pairs, and Schulze voting, there is always a regret-free, semi-honest ballot for any voter, holding all other ballots constant and assuming they know enough about how others will vote. Under such circumstances, there is always at least one way for a voter to participate without grading any less-preferred candidate above any more-preferred one. ^ ^a ^b A variant of Minimax that counts only pairwise opposition, not opposition minus support, fails the Condorcet criterion and meets later-no-harm. ^ A randomly chosen ballot determines winner. This and closely related methods are of mathematical interest and included here to demonstrate that even unreasonable methods can pass voting method criteria. ^ Where a winner is randomly chosen from the candidates, sortition is included to demonstrate that even non-voting methods can pass some criteria.

v t e Comparison of preferential voting systems
	Monotonic	Condorcet	Majority	Condorcet loser	Majority loser	Mutual majority	Smith	ISDA	LIIA	Clone independence	Reversal symmetry	Participation, Consistency	Later-no‑harm	Later-no‑help	Polynomial time	Resolvability
Ranked pairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Schulze	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Kemeny-Young	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Copeland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Nanson	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Instant-runoff voting	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Borda	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baldwin	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bucklin	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plurality	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contingent voting	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coombs^[1]	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
MiniMax	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Anti-plurality^[1]	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Sri Lankan contingent voting	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supplementary voting	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dodgson^[1]	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: should distinguish "Independence of Clone Teams" vs "Independence of Clone Spoilers". These are two very different properties and critically important. For example, Two-Round System, the most commonly used single-winner voting system, is immune to political parties cloning candidates to win. This distinction is lost when deeming the system to fail "Independence of Clones" simply because cloning oneself can cause the candidate to loose (arguably a reasonable property so long as it does not prevent diversified candidates from entering).

v t e Comparison of Preferential Voting Systems
	Winner Selection								Strategic Voting				Strategic Nomination			Counting
	Majority	Majority Loser	Mutual Majority	Condorcet	Condorcet Loser	Smith	Reversal Symmetry	Consistency, Participation	Monotonic	First‑Choice‑First	Later‑No‑Harm	Later‑No‑Help	Independence of Clones	Independence of Smith‑Dominated Alternatives	Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives	Sortable O(1) or O(log N)	Summable O(N)	Polynomial Time	Resolvability
Ranked Pairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Schulze	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Kemeny-Young	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Copeland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Instant-Runoff Voting	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Nanson	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Two-Round System	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plurality	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Borda	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Anti-Plurality^[1]	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contingent Vote	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Baldwin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bucklin (Equal Rankings)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Supplementary Vote	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Coombs^[1]	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Minimum Opposition (Equal Rankings)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
MiniMax (Winning Votes or Margins)	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Dodgson	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Note: need to add Plurality Criterion and complete compliances.

v t e Comparison of Preferential Voting Systems (Cloning Failures Distinguished)
	Winner Selection								Strategic Voting				Strategic Nomination				Counting
	Majority	Majority Loser	Mutual Majority	Condorcet	Condorcet Loser	Smith	Reversal Symmetry	Consistency, Participation	Monotonic	First‑Choice‑First	Later‑No‑Harm	Later‑No‑Help	Independence of Team Clones	Independence of Spoiler Clones	Independence of Smith‑Dominated Alternatives	Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives	Sortable O(1) or O(log N)	Summable O(N)	Polynomial Time	Resolvability
Ranked Pairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Schulze	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Kemeny-Young	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Instant-Runoff Voting	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Copeland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Plurality	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Borda	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nanson	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Anti-Plurality	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contingent Vote	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Two-Round System	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baldwin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bucklin (Equal Rankings)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Supplementary Vote	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Coombs	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Minimum Opposition (Equal Rankings)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
MiniMax (Winning Votes or Margins)	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	?	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Dodgson	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	?	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Note: need to complete table and resort. Q: Should Majority/Majority Loser/Mutual Majority be defined so that MajorityJudgment Passes? Argument in favor: Median Winner Rating methods are distinguished from Mean (Average) Winner Ratings Methods (e.g. Range Voting) because of their distinctive ability to identify majority preferences within voter ratings.

v t e Comparison of Voting Systems
	Winner Selection												Strategic Voting				Strategic Nomination					Counting
	Plurality	Majority	Majority Loser	Mutual Majority	Condorcet	Condorcet Loser	Smith	Expressive Approval	Expressive Average	Expressive Median	Reversal Symmetry	Consistency, Participation	Monotonic	First‑Choice‑First	Later‑No‑Harm	Later‑No‑Help	Independence of Team Clones	Independence of Spoiler Clones	Independence of Mutual‑Minorities	Independence of Smith‑Dominated Alternatives	Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives	Sortable O(1) or O(log N)	Summable O(N)	Polynomial Time	Resolvability
Majority Judgment (Unlimited Ratings)	Yes	?	?	?	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ranked Pairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Schulze	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Kemeny-Young	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Instant-Runoff Voting	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Copeland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Plurality	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Borda	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nanson	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	?	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Anti-Plurality	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contingent Vote	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Two-Round System	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baldwin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	?	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bucklin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	?	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Supplementary Vote	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Coombs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	?	?	?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Minimum Opposition	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	?	?	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
MiniMax (Winning Votes or Margins)	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	?	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Range Voting (Unlimited Ratings)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Approval	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dodgson	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	?	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as ${\tfrac {1}{2}}$ A > B > C and ${\tfrac {1}{2}}$ A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then Later-no-harm and Later-no-help are not applicable. Cite error: The named reference "truncation" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

[condorcet-iia-incompatibility-1] ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g Condorcet's criterion is incompatible with the consistency, participation, later-no-harm, later-no-help, and sincere favorite criteria.

[IIA_rating_methods-2] Approval voting, score voting, and majority judgment satisfy IIA if it is assumed that voters rate candidates independently using their own absolute scale. For this to hold, in some elections, some voters must use less than their full voting power despite having meaningful preferences among viable candidates.

[3] Majority Judgment may elect a candidate uniquely least-preferred by over half of voters, but it never elects the candidate uniquely bottom-rated by over half of voters.

[mjmmc-4] Majority Judgment fails the mutual majority criterion, but satisfies the criterion if the majority ranks the mutually favored set above a given absolute grade and all others below that grade.

[semipc-5] In Highest median, Ranked Pairs, and Schulze voting, there is always a regret-free, semi-honest ballot for any voter, holding all other ballots constant and assuming they know enough about how others will vote. Under such circumstances, there is always at least one way for a voter to participate without grading any less-preferred candidate above any more-preferred one.

[MinimaxVarient-6] A variant of Minimax that counts only pairwise opposition, not opposition minus support, fails the Condorcet criterion and meets later-no-harm.

[7] A randomly chosen ballot determines winner. This and closely related methods are of mathematical interest and included here to demonstrate that even unreasonable methods can pass voting method criteria.

[8] Where a winner is randomly chosen from the candidates, sortition is included to demonstrate that even non-voting methods can pass some criteria.

[truncation-9] Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as ${\tfrac {1}{2}}$ A > B > C and ${\tfrac {1}{2}}$ A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then Later-no-harm and Later-no-help are not applicable. Cite error: The named reference "truncation" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

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